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ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL—UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT DECLARES TEXAS’ RESTRICTIONS ON 
ABORTION FACILITIES UNCONSTITUTIONAL: IMPACT ON 
STATES WITH SIMILAR ABORTION RESTRICTIONS 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt et al., the United States 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional two controversial provisions of a 
Texas law, which subjected abortion clinics to ambulatory surgical center 
standards and required their physicians to obtain admitting privileges at 
nearby hospitals.  The Court reasoned that both the surgical center 
requirement and the admitting privileges requirement provided few, if any, 
health benefits to women, posed a substantial obstacle in the path of women 
seeking abortions, and constituted an “undue burden” on abortion access.  
The Court concluded that the provisions were unconstitutional.  
Additionally, the Court held that res judicata did not bar the petitioners’ 
challenge to either the admitting privileges requirement or the surgical 
center requirement.  Last, the Court considered Texas’ three additional 
arguments and deemed none persuasive.  Whole Woman’s Health is likely 
the most significant abortion case in a quarter-century.  This case reaffirms 
the “undue burden” standard provided in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and will likely 
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In July 2013, the Texas Legislature enacted House Bill 2 (“H.B. 2”), 
which contained two controversial restrictions on abortion facilities in 
Texas.1  The “admitting privileges requirement” provided that “[a] 
physician performing or inducing an abortion . . . must, on the date [of 
service], have active admitting privileges at a hospital . . . located not 
further than 30 miles from the” abortion facility.2  The “surgical center 
requirement” mandates that an abortion facility meet the “minimum 
 
1.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300-01 (2016). 
2.  Id. at 2300 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a) (West 2015)). 
          
2016] CASE COMMENT 215 
standards . . . for ambulatory surgical centers” under Texas law.3  The 
petitioners, a group of Texas abortion providers, challenged the restrictions 
as unconstitutional.4  The petitioners claimed the restrictions violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution as interpreted in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey.5  In Casey, the Court concluded 
that a provision of law is constitutionally invalid if the “purpose or effect” 
of the provision “is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion.”6 
The respondents, the State of Texas and its elected officials, argued 
both the admitting privileges requirement and the surgical center 
requirement protected women’s health and were, thus, constitutional.7  A 
“[s]tate has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion . . . is performed 
under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient.”8  The 
respondents contended that the petitioners’ constitutional claims were 
barred by res judicata.9  Lastly, respondents made three additional 
arguments for why the invalidation of both challenged provisions was 
precluded.10 
Before H.B. 2 took effect, a group of Texas abortion providers filed an 
action in federal district court, Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. 
Surgical Health Serv. v. Abbott, seeking facial invalidation of the law’s 
admitting privileges provision.11  The district court granted an injunction in 
favor of the abortion providers.12  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
subsequently vacated the injunction and upheld the admitting privileges 
provision.13  The abortion providers did not file a petition for certiorari to 
the United States Supreme Court.14 
One week after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Abbott, the petitioners 
(many of whom were plaintiffs in Abbott) filed the present lawsuit in 
federal district court.15  The district court ruled in favor of the petitioners 
 
3.  Id. (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(a) (West 2015)). 
4.  Id. at 2301. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992). 
7.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2311, 2315. 
8.  Id. at 2296 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973)). 
9.  Id. at 2305. 
10.  Id. at 2318. 
11.  Id. at 2300. 
12.  Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. 
Supp. 2d 891, 901 (WD Tex. 2013)). 
13.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (citing Abbott, 734 F.3d at 419). 
14.  Id. at 2301. 
15.  Id.  
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and enjoined the enforcement of the two provisions.16  The Fifth Circuit 
later reversed the district court’s ruling, holding that the admitting 
privileges requirement and the surgical center requirement were 
unconstitutional.17  As a result, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari 
and the United States Supreme Court granted review. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The constitutionality of laws regulating abortion is one of the most 
controversial issues in American law.18  In Roe v. Wade, the seminal 1973 
abortion case, the United States Supreme Court ruled that women possess a 
fundamental right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy by having an 
abortion.19  In Roe, the Court explained that this fundamental right springs 
from the constitutional rights of privacy and liberty arising under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20  The Roe Court concluded 
that the government could restrict the right to abortion, if the restriction was 
necessary to fulfill a “compelling” government interest.21  The Court 
explained that the right must be measured against the state’s interests in 
safeguarding health, maintaining medical standards, and in protecting life.22 
Approximately twenty years after Roe, the Supreme Court modified its 
view on government regulation of abortion.23  In Casey, the Court said the 
government could regulate abortion, but only to protect women’s health, 
not to limit access to abortion.24  Any restriction must not impose an “undue 
burden” on a woman seeking an abortion, and the restriction will be struck 
down if it has the purpose or effect of creating a “substantial obstacle” to 
the woman attempting to access an abortion.25 
Approximately twenty-five years after Casey, Whole Woman’s Health 
helps clarify when a state’s regulation of abortion becomes an “undue 
burden” on a woman.26  But, before answering this constitutional question, 
the Court first considered whether the petitioners were barred from bringing 
their constitutional challenges by result of res judicata.27  The doctrine of 
 
16.  Id. at 2303. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
19.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973). 
20.  Id. at 153 
21.  Id. at 154. 
22.  Id. 
23.  See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
24.  Id. at 877-78. 
25.  Id. 
26.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309-18. 
 27.  Id. at 2304. 
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claim preclusion, an aspect of res judicata, prohibits “‘successive litigation 
of the very same claim’ by the same parties.”28  “[P]ublic policy dictates 
that there be an end of litigation[,] that those who have contested an issue 
shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall 
be considered forever settled between the parties.”29  But, the development 
of new material facts can mean that a new case, and an otherwise similar 
previous case, do not present the same claim.30 
The Supreme Court next considered the constitutional issues.  In 
Casey, the Court laid out “undue burden,” the relevant level of scrutiny.31  
The “[s]tate has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any 
other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure 
maximum safety for the patient.”32  But, “a statute, which while furthering 
[a] valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of 
serving its legitimate ends.”33  “[U]nnecessary health regulations that have 
the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman 
seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.”34  Accordingly, 
the rule announced in Casey, requires courts to consider the burdens that a 
law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits that the law 
confers.35  Courts then must consider whether any burden imposed on 
abortion access is “undue.”36 
The Court finally considered Texas’ argument regarding the effect of 
H.B. 2’s severability clause.  Generally, a severability clause provides that 
if any provision of an act is found to be invalid, the remaining provisions 
shall be severed and shall not be affected.37  Severability clauses express the 
enacting legislature’s preference for a narrow judicial remedy.38 
In recent years, many states have passed laws restricting abortion.  In 
fact, in 2016, antiabortion advocates in fourteen states passed thirty laws in 
 
28.  Id. at 2305 (citing New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001)). 
29.  Id. at 2331 (citing Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Assn., 283 U.S. 522, 525 
(1931)). 
30.  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. f (1980). 
31.  Id. at 2309; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
32.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973). 
33.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 877). 
34.  Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878). 
35.  Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-98). 
36.  Id. at 2310. 
37.  See Severability Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
38.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2319.  According to the Court, “a severability 
clause is an aid merely; not an inexorable command.”  Id. (quoting Reno v. American Civil 
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 884-85 (1997)). 
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an attempt to make obtaining an abortion difficult.39  The heated debate 
continues regarding how far the government can go in regulating abortion 
and when the regulation becomes unconstitutional.  As such, the Supreme 
Court granted the petitioners’ writ for certiorari and addressed this 
controversial question. 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Whole Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court ruled the petitioners’ 
constitutional claims were not barred by res judicata.40  The Court ruled 
both the admitting privileges requirement and the surgical center 
requirement placed a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking 
abortions and constituted an “undue burden” on abortion access.41  The 
Court concluded that both H.B. 2 requirements violated the Constitution.42  
The Court then looked at Texas’ three additional arguments, particularity 
Texas’ severability clause argument, and found them unpersuasive.43 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION: TEXAS’ HOUSE BILL 2 IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
On June 27, 2016,44 the Supreme Court voted 5-3 in favor of the 
petitioners in Whole Woman’s Health.45  Justice Breyer wrote for the 
majority.46  Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, Kennedy, and Sotomayor joined in 
the majority opinion.47 
1. Res Judicata and Petitioners’ Claims 
First, the Court held res judicata neither bars the petitioners’ challenges 
to the admitting privileges requirement nor prevents the Court from 
awarding facial relief.48  The doctrine of claim preclusion, the relevant 
aspect of res judicata, does not apply even though several of the petitioners 
previously brought an unsuccessful facial challenge to the admitting 
 
39.  Amber Phillips, 14 states have passed laws this year making it harder to get an 
abortion, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2016/06/01/14-states-have-passed-laws-making-it-harder-to-get-an-abortion-already-this-
year/#. 
40.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309. 
41.  Id. at 2318. 
42.  Id. at 2319. 
43.  Id. 
44.  Id. at 2292. 
45.  Id. at 2299. 
46.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2299. 
47.  Id. 
48.  Id. at 2304. 
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privileges requirement in Abbott.49  Claim preclusion prohibits “successive 
litigation of the very same claim” by the same parties.50  The Court 
reasoned that the Abbott plaintiffs’ constitutional claim regarding the 
admitting privileges requirement was not the same claim the petitioners 
brought in this case.51  The Court explained that the Abbott plaintiffs 
brought their challenge to the admitting privileges requirement prior to its 
enforcement¾before many abortion clinics had closed and while it was still 
unclear how many clinics would be affected.52  In this case, the petitioners 
brought a challenge to the requirement after its enforcement¾after a large 
number of clinics had in fact closed.53  Changed circumstances showing 
that a constitutional harm is concrete may give rise to a new claim.54  Thus, 
the Court concluded that the challenge brought by the petitioners in this 
case and the one brought by the plaintiffs in Abbott were not the exact same 
claim.55  The doctrine of claim preclusion did not bar a new challenge to the 
admitting privileges requirement.56 
The Court determined that res judicata did not preclude facial relief 
even though the petitioners did not specifically request it.57  In addition to 
asking for as-applied relief, the petitioners asked for any further relief as the 
Court deemed just, proper, and equitable.58  The Court explained that the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that a “final judgment should grant 
the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded 
that relief in its pleadings.”59  The Court had previously held if the 
arguments and evidence show that a statutory provision is unconstitutional 
on its face, an injunction prohibiting its enforcement is “proper”.60  The 
Court concluded that nothing prevents it from awarding facial relief as the 
appropriate remedy for the petitioners’ claims.61 
Second, the Court also held that claim preclusion did not bar the 
petitioners’ challenge to the surgical center requirement.62  The petitioners 
 
49.  Id. at 2309. 
50.  Id. at 2305 (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001)). 
51.  Id. at 2304-07. 
52.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2306. 
53.  Id. 
54.  Id. at 2305. 
55.  Id. at 2307. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. 
58.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2307. 
59.  Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P 54(c)). 
60.  Id. (citing Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 333 (2010)). 
61.  See id. 
62.  Id. at 2309. 
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were not required to bring their challenge to the surgical center provision 
when they challenged the admitting privileges provision in Abbott.63  The 
Court first explained that it has never suggested that challenges to two 
distinctive statutory provisions serving two different functions must be 
brought in a single suit.64  Lower courts normally treat challenges to distinct 
regulatory requirement as separate claims even when they are part of a 
larger regulatory scheme.65  At the time that the petitioners filed Abbott, the 
Texas Department of State Health Services had not issued any rules 
implementing the surgical center requirement.66  It was unclear whether the 
rules would contain provisions granting special waivers to existing abortion 
clinics, similar to those afforded to non-abortion surgical centers.67  In 
addition, relevant factual circumstances changed between Abbott and the 
present lawsuit; many abortion clinics had closed as a result of H.B. 2.68  
For all of these reasons, the Court concluded that the doctrine of claim 
preclusion did not prevent the petitioners from bringing a challenge to the 
surgical-center requirements.69  As such, none of the petitioners’ 
constitutional claims were barred by res judicata.70 
2. The Admitting Privileges Requirement 
The Supreme Court held that the admitting privileges requirement 
placed a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion and 
constituted an undue burden on abortion access.71  The purpose of the 
admitting privileges requirement was to help ensure women had easy access 
to a hospital should complications arise during an abortion procedure.72  
Before the enactment of the admitting privileges requirement in H.B. 2, 
doctors who provided abortions were required to “have admitting privileges 
or a close working arrangement with a physician(s) who has admitting 
privileges at a local hospital.”73  Prior to the passage of H.B. 2, abortions in 
Texas were considered very safe because there was a considerably low rate 
 
63.  Id. 
64.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2308. 
65.  Id. (The surgical-center requirement and the admitting privileges requirement are two 
distinct provisions of H.B. 2, which even have different enforcement dates.). 
66.  Id. 
67.  Id. 
68.  Id. at 2306-07. 
69.  Id. at 2309. 
70.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2297. 
71.  Id. at 2296. 
72.  Id. at 2311. 
73.  Id. at 2310 (citing 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §139.56 (2009)). 
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of serious complications.74  There was no significant health-related problem 
that the admitting privileges requirement helped cure.75  No evidence in the 
record existed to depict that, compared to the prior law, the new law 
advanced Texas’ interest in protecting women’s health.76 
The evidence did, however, indicate that the admitting privileges 
requirement placed a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice” 
to have an abortion.77  For example, the number of facilities providing 
abortions dropped by half, from about forty to about twenty, after Texas 
began enforcing the admitting privileges requirement.78  The closures meant 
“fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased crowding” at the 
remaining clinics.79  After the admitting privileges provision went into 
effect, many women had to drive further distances to get to an abortion 
provider.80  These burdens, when viewed in light of the absence of any 
health benefit, led the Court to conclude that the admitting privileges 
requirement placed a substantial obstacle on a woman’s choice to have an 
abortion.81  As such, the admitting privileges requirement constituted an 
“undue burden” on abortion access.82 
3. The Surgical-Center Requirements 
The Court concluded that “the surgical-center requirement, like the 
admitting privileges requirement, provide[d] few, if any, health benefits for 
women and pose[d] a substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions.”83  
The Court held that the surgical-center requirements constituted an “undue 
burden” on women’s constitutional right to have abortions.84 
Prior to the enactment of the surgical-center requirements, Texas law 
already “required abortion facilities to meet a host of health and safety 
requirements.”85  “H.B. 2 added the requirement that an ‘abortion facility’ 
meet the minimum standards . . . for ambulatory surgical centers under 
 
74.  Id. at 2311 (citing Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 684 (W.D. 
Texas 2014)). 
75.  Id. 
76.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2311. 
77.  Id. at 2309 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
877 (1992)). 
78.  Id. at 2312 (citing Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 681). 
79.  Id. at 2313. 
80.  Id. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2313. 
83.  Id. at 2318. 
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. at 2314. 
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Texas law.”86  The surgical-center requirements included, among other 
things, detailed specifications relating to the size of the nursing staff, 
building dimensions, and other building requirements.87  The Court 
reasoned that the evidence in the record indicated the new requirements did 
not benefit patients and were, therefore, unnecessary.88  The district court 
was correct in determining that the “risks are not appreciably lowered for 
patients who undergo abortions at ambulatory surgical centers as compared 
to nonsurgical-center facilities.”89  The Court explained that the evidence 
indicated that abortions taking place in an abortion facility were “safe – in 
fact, safer than numerous procedures that took place outside of hospitals” 
and to which Texas did not apply surgical-center requirement.90  Many 
surgical-center requirements were inappropriate as applied to surgical 
abortions.91  For these reasons, the Court agreed with the district court in 
determining that many of the surgical-center requirements had such a 
tangential relationship to patient safety in the context of abortion as to be 
arbitrary.92  Because the surgical-center requirements did not provide better 
care or more frequent positive outcomes, they were deemed unnecessary.93 
The surgical-center requirements placed a substantial obstacle in the 
path of women seeking an abortion.94  Expert testimony suggested that the 
surgical-center requirements would increase by a factor of five, the number 
of abortions to be performed by the remaining facilities.95  The Court 
explained that an existing abortion facility could not likely perform five 
times as many abortions as it currently does without increasing the size of 
its facility and staff.96  The facilities would have to incur other considerable 
costs to meet all of the surgical-center requirements.97  Women would 
likely have to travel longer distances to get abortions in crammed-to-
capacity superfacilities, which meet the surgical center requirements.98  In 
addition, women seeking abortions would be less likely to receive 
individualized attention, serious conversation, and emotional support 
 
86.  Id. (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010 (West 2015)). 
87.  Id. 
88.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2315. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. 
92.  Id. at 2316. 
93.  Id. 
94.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2316. 
95.  Id. 
96.  Id. 
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. at 2318. 
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doctors.99  As such, the Court inferred that quality of care would decline as 
a result of the surgical-center requirements, which would be harmful to, not 
supportive of, women’s health.100  The Court concluded that the surgical-
center requirements made it much more difficult for women to access 
abortion services;101 and, like the admitting privileges requirement, 
provided few, if any health benefits for women.102  Therefore, the Court 
held that the surgical-center requirements were unconstitutional.103 
4. Texas’ Three Additional Arguments 
The Court was not persuaded by Texas’ three additional arguments.104  
First, Texas argued that facial invalidation of both challenged provisions 
was precluded by H.B. 2’s severability clause.105  Texas contended that any 
portion of H.B. 2 that was invalid must be severed and the remaining 
portion must not be affected.106  The Court explained that when it has been 
confronted with a facially unconstitutional statutory provision, it has never 
been required to parse through the entire provision and determine whether 
any single application of the provision may be valid.107  If a severability 
clause could impose such a requirement on courts, legislatures would be 
able to insulate unconstitutional statutes from most facial review.108  The 
Court’s judicial remedy would involve quintessentially legislative work.109  
Such an approach would inflict enormous costs on both courts and 
litigants.110  The Court rejected Texas’ invitation to pave the way for 
legislatures to immunize their statutes from facial review.111 
Second, Texas claimed that, although required by Casey, the 
challenged provisions “do not impose a substantial obstacle because the 
women affected are not a ‘large fraction’ of Texan women ‘of reproductive 
age . . . .’”112  The Court explained that Casey used the language “large 
fraction” to refer to a large fraction of cases in which the provision was 
 
99.  Id. 
100.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318. 
101.  Id. 
102.  Id. 
103.  Id. 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2319. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Id. 
109.  Id. 
110.  Id. 
111.  Id. 
112.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320. 
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relevant.113  In this case, as in Casey, the relevant denominator was women 
for whom the provision was an actual, rather than an irrelevant, 
restriction.114  The Court determined that the provisions should be judged 
by the effect they have on women seeking abortions in Texas that would be 
deterred by the provisions.115 
Third, Texas looked for support in Simopoulos v. Virginia,116 a case in 
which the Court upheld the surgical-center requirements as applied to 
second-trimester abortions.117  The Court explained that unlike Simopoulos, 
this case involved restrictions applicable to all abortions.118  The petitioner 
in Simopoulos, unlike the petitioners here, waived any argument that the 
regulation did not protect women’s health.119  The Court concluded 
Simopoulos did not provide clear guidance in this case.120 
5. Majority’s Conclusion 
For the reasons above, the Court ruled the petitioners’ constitutional 
claims were not barred by res judicata.121  Because they created an undue 
burden, the Court ruled the admitting privileges requirement and the 
surgical-center requirements violated the Constitution.122 Finally, the Court 
looked at Texas’ three additional arguments and found them all 
unpersuasive.123 
B. THE CONCURRING OPINION 
Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer’s majority opinion.124  Justice 
Ginsburg also filed a separate concurring opinion.125  In her concurrence, 
Justice Ginsburg lifted the veil on Texas’ H.B. 2 laws and called them what 
she believed they truly were—targeted regulation of abortion providers 
laws.126 
 
113.  Id. 
114.  Id. 
115.  Id. 
116.  462 U.S. 506 (1983) 
117.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320. 
118.  Id. 
119.  Id. 
120.  Id. 
121.  Id. at 2309. 
122.  Id. at 2318. 
123.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318. 
124.  Id. at 2299. 
125.  Id. at 2320. 
126.  Id. at 2321. 
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1. Justice Ginsburg’s Concurrence: House Bill 2’s Restrictions 
Are Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers Laws 
In a two-page concurrence, Justice Ginsburg explained it was “beyond 
rational belief that H.B. 2 could genuinely protect the health of women.”127  
In truth, complications resulting from abortions are rare and typically not 
dangerous.128  Many medical procedures, including childbirth, are far more 
dangerous than abortion, yet are not subject to admitting privileges 
requirement or surgical-center requirements.129  Justice Ginsburg reasoned 
that when a state limits access to safe and legal procedures, women in 
desperate circumstances may resort to unlicensed practitioners.130  Justice 
Ginsburg concluded that targeted regulation of abortion providers laws, like 
H.B. 2 that “do little or nothing for health, but rather strew impediments to 
abortion” could not survive judicial inspection.131 
C. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS 
Two Justices wrote dissents in Whole Woman’s Health.  Each 
dissenting Justice disagreed with and criticized the majority for bending 
basic rules because abortion was the subject at issue.  Justice Thomas 
dissented separately to criticize the Court’s habit of applying different rules 
to different constitutional rights¾especially the right to abortion.132  Justice 
Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, filed a second 
dissenting opinion accusing the majority of disregarding basic 
jurisprudential rules that apply in all other cases.133 
1. Justice Thomas’s Dissent: Court Bends the Rules For Abortion 
Cases 
In the first Whole Woman’s Health dissent, Justice Thomas wrote about 
his concerns with the Court’s tendency “to bend the rules when any effort to 
limit abortion, or even speak in opposition to abortion, is at issue.”134  
According to Justice Thomas, “A plaintiff either possesses the 
constitutional right he is asserting or not – and if not, the judiciary has no 
 
127.  Id. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
128.  Id. at 2320 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. 
Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 2015)). 
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130.  Id. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
131.  Id. (quoting Schimel, 806 F.3d at 921). 
132.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2321 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
133.  Id. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
134.  Id. at 2321 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 954 
(2000)). 
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business creating ad hoc exceptions so that others can assert rights that 
seem especially important to vindicate.”135  For example, Justice Thomas 
contended that the Court had erroneously allowed doctors and clinics to 
vicariously vindicate the constitutional right of women seeking abortions.136  
Ordinarily, plaintiffs could not file suits to vindicate the rights of others.137  
However, Justice Thomas noted that over time, the Court has shown a 
particular willingness to undercut restrictions on third-party standing when 
the right to abortion is at stake.138 
Justice Thomas explained, “A law either infringes a constitutional 
right, or not; there is not room for the judiciary to invent tolerable degrees 
of encroachment.”139  Justice Thomas, for example, argued that whatever 
level of scrutiny the majority applied to H.B. 2, it was not the undue-burden 
test the Court articulated in Casey and its successors.140  Justice Thomas 
argued the majority radically rewrote Casey’s undue-burden test.141  To 
Justice Thomas, the majority’s undue-burden test looked less like the 
Court’s post Casey precedents and far more like the strict scrutiny standard 
that Casey rejected, under which only the most compelling rationales 
justified restrictions on abortion.142  Justice Thomas explained that the 
majority’s reconfiguration of the standard of scrutiny applicable to abortion 
pointed to a deeper problem.143  “[T]he Court applies whatever standard it 
likes to any given case, nothing but empty words separates our 
constitutional decisions from judicial fiat.”144 
Ultimately, Justice Thomas warned that unless the Court abided by one 
set of rules to adjudicate constitutional rights, the Court would continue 
reducing constitutional law to policy-driven value judgments.145  To Justice 
Thomas, the majority’s embrace of a jurisprudence of rights-specific 
exceptions and balancing tests was a concession of defeat.146 
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2. Justice Alito’s Dissent: Court Fails to Apply Basic 
Jurisprudential Principles 
In the second Whole Woman’s Health dissent, Justice Alito, joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, wrote about his concern that the 
majority disregarded basic rules that apply in all other cases.147  In his 
lengthy dissent, Alito explained that the Court had an obligation to apply 
basic jurisprudential rules in a neutral fashion, regardless of the subject of 
the suit.148  “If anything, when a case involves a controversial issue, we 
should be especially careful to be scrupulously neutral in applying such 
rules.”149 
First, Alito contended that claim preclusion should have barred the 
petitioners from bringing their challenge to H.B. 2’s admitting privileges 
provision.150  The petitioners had already lost their admitting privileges 
challenge in Abbott.151  Under rules that apply in regular cases, the 
petitioners could not relitigate the exact same claim in a second suit.152  
Justice Alito explained that claim preclusion does not contain a “better 
evidence” exception. 153  A plaintiff who loses in a first case cannot later 
bring the same case simply because it has now gathered better evidence¾in 
this case, additional abortion clinics closing.154  To Justice Alito, the Abbott 
petitioners lost on the merits and chose not to petition the Supreme Court 
for review.155  Justice Alito explained that the majority awarded a victory to 
the petitioners on the very same claim that they unsuccessfully pressed in 
Abbott.156 
Second, Justice Alito explained that the doctrine of claim preclusion 
also barred claims that were closely related to the claims unsuccessfully 
litigated in a prior case.157  To Justice Alito, “it [was] evident that the 
petitioners’ challenges to the admitting privileges requirement and the ASC 
requirement [were] part of the same transaction or series of connect 
transactions.”158  Justice Alito argued that the petitioners’ facial attack on 
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the ambulatory surgical-center requirements, like the facial attack on the 
admitting privileges requirement, should be precluded by res judicata.159 
Next, Justice Alito suggested that while there was no doubt that H.B. 2 
caused some abortion clinics to close, other clinics may have closed for 
different reasons.160  Justice Alito pointed to a lack of evidence regarding 
the capacity of the clinics that were able to comply with H.B. 2’s 
requirements.161  He criticized the majority for inferring the surgical centers 
that performed abortions after H.B. 2’s enactment lacked the necessary 
capacity to perform all the abortions sought by women in Texas.162 
Finally, Justice Alito argued that the majority was wrong to conclude 
that the admitting privileges requirement and surgical-center requirements 
must have been enjoined in their entirety.163  Any responsible application of 
the H.B. 2 severability provision would leave much of the law intact.164  
Justice Alito suggested that if the Court was unwilling to undertake the 
careful severability analysis required, it should have remanded to the lower 
courts for a remedy tailored to the specific facts shown in the case.165  To 
Justice Alito, there was no reason to strike down all applications of the 
challenged provisions.166 
Justice Alito’s dissent highlighted his concern that the Court applies 
basic rules inconsistently.  He suggested that when the Court decides cases 
on controversial issues, the Court should take special care to apply settled 
procedural rules in a neutral manner.167  To Justice Alito, the majority failed 
to apply basic jurisprudential principles in a neutral fashion.168 
IV. IMPACT 
The Whole Woman’s Health decision has a direct impact on states with 
similar abortion laws to Texas’ H.B. 2.  The Whole Woman’s Health ruling 
will likely lead to abortion providers challenging their state’s admitting 
privileges and surgical center laws.  This case sets the national legal 
precedent regarding admitting privileges and surgical-center requirements.  
Because the Supreme Court concluded H.B. 2 was unconstitutional, other 
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states’ admitting privileges and surgical-center laws will likely also be 
found unconstitutional.  North Dakota, for example, has an admitting 
privileges requirement that is very similar to H.B. 2.  North Dakota Century 
Code Section 14-02.1-04 (1) states in relevant part: “All physicians 
performing abortion procedures must have admitting privileges at a hospital 
located within thirty miles of the abortion facility and staff privileges to 
replace hospital on-staff physicians at that hospital.  These privileges must 
include the abortion procedures the physician will be performing at abortion 
facilities.”169 
The Whole Woman’s Health decision does not automatically nullify 
North Dakota’s admitting privileges law, which was passed in 2013.170  
Because North Dakota’s admitting privileges provision is so similar to 
Texas’ unconstitutional admitting privileges provision, North Dakota’s law 
will likely be challenged.  In fact, soon after the Court’s decision in Whole 
Woman’s Health, Tammi Kromenaker, director of the Red River Women’s 
Clinic in Fargo, North Dakota’s lone abortion clinic, said, “[W]e’ll certainly 
take a look at it and figure out how to move forward.”171  She said, “At this 
point, because it’s so fresh, our attorneys are still analyzing the decision.  
But the bottom line is the fight does not end today.”172 
If and when North Dakota’s admitting privileges law is challenged, 
North Dakota’s courts will likely rely on Whole Woman’s Health.  
Ultimately, North Dakota’s courts will have to decide whether the admitting 
privileges law creates an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to have an 
abortion.  In making this determination, the courts must consider the effect 
the law has on women seeking abortions.  In 2014, 1,264 abortions were 
performed in North Dakota.173  Furthermore, unlike in Texas, only one 
provider performs abortions in North Dakota.174  If the lone abortion clinic 
were forced to close, North Dakota women would have to travel outside of 
the State to obtain safe and legal abortions.  The court will also have to 
determine if the burdens associated with the admitting privileges law, when 
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viewed in light of any health benefits, place a substantial obstacle on a 
woman’s choice to have an abortion. 
Whole Woman’s Health does not necessarily dictate that North 
Dakota’s admitting privileges requirement is unconstitutional.  North 
Dakota Attorney General Wayne Stenehjem said, 
[I]t doesn’t guarantee a challenge to North Dakota’s law would 
succeed because the clinic would have to show the law creates an 
“undue burden” on a woman’s right to an abortion. “It might be a 
challenge for them to claim an undue burden when in fact they 
asked for and obtained admitting privileges.”175 
In 2013, soon after North Dakota’s admitting privileges requirement 
passed, the Center for Reproductive Rights (“the Center”) filed a lawsuit on 
behalf of Fargo’s abortion clinic.176  The Center claimed that the admitting 
privileges requirement effectively made abortion illegal in North Dakota.177  
The lawsuit was subsequently removed from the docket, after a settlement 
was reached between the State and the Fargo abortion clinic.178  Sanford 
Health (“Sanford”) granted the Red River Women’s Clinic’s physicians 
admitting privileges.179  Sanford agreed to “maintain admitting privileges 
for the clinic’s physicians as long as they maintain certain training, 
education, and certification requirements.”180  Because Sanford granted the 
Red River Women’s Clinic’s physicians admitting privileges, North 
Dakota’s admitting privileges law does not currently interfere with the 
abortion clinic’s services.  However, if for any reason Sanford decides to 
deny the Red River Women’s Clinic’s physicians admitting privileges, 
North Dakota’s admitting privileges law would likely cause North Dakota’s 
lone abortion clinic to close. 
Only time will tell if and when abortion providers will bring a lawsuit 
challenging North Dakota’s admitting privileges law.  If the law is 
challenged, North Dakota courts will have to decide if the admitting 
privileges law creates an undue burden on a woman’s right to have an 
abortion.  Whole Woman’s Health provides guidance on this question. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In Whole Woman’s Health et al. v. Hellerstedt et al., the United States 
Supreme Court held two controversial provisions of a Texas law, which 
subjected abortion clinics to ambulatory surgical center standards and 
required their physicians to obtain admitting privileges at nearby hospitals, 
violated the Constitution.  The Court held that res judicata did not bar the 
petitioners’ challenges to either the admitting privileges requirement or the 
surgical-center requirements.  Whole Woman’s Health is likely the most 
significant abortion case in the last twenty-five years, by reaffirming the 
“undue burden” standard and likely impacting abortion restrictions in other 
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